India-Bangladesh relations are entering a critical phase of structural recalibration, transitioning from a decade-long “Golden Chapter” to a period of strategic uncertainty following the August 2024 regime change. While the departure of Sheikh Hasina shattered the predictable, highly secure framework of the past, long-term economic and geographical interdependence makes a complete breakdown of relations highly unlikely. Consider the fact that on 7 August, itself, Bangladesh has sought enhanced diesel supplies from India due to gas and oil shortages. At the same time, there have been strong objections to India ‘permitting’ former PM Sheikh Hasina to address a press conference on her future political plans.
This reflects the regime change and extradition dilemma. Following the ousting of Sheikh Hasina, her residence in India remains a massive diplomatic trigger point. The pro-Pakistan Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami is reviving anti-India rhetoric, posing fresh concerns for India’s border stability. The interim government under Mohd Younus normalised diplomatic engagement with Pakistan and pivoted closer to Chinese-backed infrastructure projects, raising maritime and security alarms in New Delhi.
Despite political turbulence, however, multiple irreversible dependencies prevent the total collapse of bilateral ties. Bangladesh’s core $47 billion Ready-Made Garment (RMG) sector relies entirely on Indian raw cotton, fabric, yarn, and manufacturing machinery. Bangladesh remains dependent on cross-border grids, including electricity from the Maitree Super Thermal Power Plant and cross-border fuel via the India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline. Under older agreements, India secured access to the Chittagong and Mongla Ports to bypass its narrow land bottlenecks and feed its North Eastern states.
India and the new regime under PM Tarique Rahman are likely to meet the challenge by transitioning to sub-national and institutional diplomacy. India is adjusting away from its “single-leader centric” foreign policy. Moving forward, India will likely engage more robustly across a spectrum of political stakeholders in Dhaka to ensure its regional investments and physical border security remain intact, rather than putting all diplomatic capital behind one faction.
There are some flashpoints such as the Ganga Water Sharing Treaty, which is set to expire in December 2026. Renegotiating this deal under a non-Awami League regime will serve as a definitive litmus test for bilateral relations. Hydro-politics and the sharing of transboundary river networks will either force functional cooperation or trigger prolonged environmental friction.
Due to rising concerns regarding minority persecution, radicalisation, and illegal migration spillover into India’s northeast, New Delhi is expected to heavily secure and fortify its physical borders. Concurrently, both nations will try to ringfence critical multilateral platforms like BIMSTEC to save cross-border economic transit routes from domestic political volatility. To keep relations moving forward through alternative channels, expect an emphasis on non-political ties. This includes establishing cross-border digital financial ties and collaborating on space diplomacy and small-scale technology launches. As of now, the BNP regime has shown a pragmatic approach to relations with India, clearly recognising the geographic compulsions. India will wait and watch, particularly in the wake of possible political turmoil should Sheikh Hasina return to Bangladesh as promised.
