By Ashish Singh
The proposed nationwide referendum in Bangladesh did not merely trigger a political disagreement. It exposed a deeper constitutional anxiety about sovereignty, legitimacy, and the proper channels of democratic authority. At issue was not simply whether citizens should vote on a national question, but whether such a vote would reinforce or undermine the parliamentary framework established by the Constitution.
Bangladeshi-Swedish writer Anisur Rahman has been unequivocal in his assessment. In his view, the referendum was unconstitutional and represented an attempt to bypass parliamentary sovereignty. The Constitution of Bangladesh provides mechanisms for amendment and reform through Parliament, which embodies the will of the electorate. To introduce a referendum outside that structure, he argues, risked displacing representative authority with a plebiscitary shortcut. The political consequences were swift. Following the 12 February 2026 parliamentary elections, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, led by newly elected Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, rejected the referendum and declined to take the oath required for its implementation. For Rahman, this was not obstruction but constitutional fidelity.
Supporters of referendums often frame them as instruments of direct democracy, a way to deepen public participation beyond periodic elections. Rahman counters that this particular proposal did not emerge from a democratic impulse but from a political calculation. He contends that the initiative sought to dilute the secular and progressive foundations of Bangladesh, principles rooted in the Liberation War of 1971. According to his account, the Yunus-led interim regime and certain advisers attempted to use the referendum to legitimise actions taken during their 18-month tenure. Rather than broadening democracy, he believes it risked becoming a plebiscitary device to consolidate executive authority.
Institutional credibility formed another fault line. The Bangladesh Election Commission, constitutionally entrusted with ensuring free and fair electoral processes, has frequently faced allegations of compromised independence. Rahman remains sceptical of its neutrality, describing it as often functioning under political influence, albeit with occasional exceptions. While he concedes that the most recent general election was not ideal, he insists it marked a return to electoral governance after what he characterises as a non-elected regime. His formulation is blunt but revealing: a badly elected government is preferable to one without electoral legitimacy. In that light, parliamentary authority, however imperfect, retains primacy over ad hoc mechanisms.
The governing party’s two-thirds majority in Parliament further complicates the rationale for a referendum. With such a mandate, the government possesses the constitutional capacity to amend legislation or reshape policy through established procedures. Rahman argues that reviving the referendum under these circumstances would not strengthen representative democracy but dilute it. When elected institutions command a decisive mandate, bypassing them through plebiscites risks normalising extra-parliamentary decision-making.
Yet Bangladesh’s political environment remains polarised. The absence of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League-led coalition from the electoral contest has, in Rahman’s words, inflicted democratic trauma. In such a context, any majoritarian initiative carries the risk of deepening divisions. At the same time, he views the current parliamentary supermajority as an opportunity to scrap the referendum and curb Islamist extremism, which he sees as a threat to the nation’s founding vision. The tension between consolidation and exclusion thus defines the moment.
Rahman’s most forceful warning concerns precedent. Had the referendum been implemented, he argues, it would have reshaped the balance among legislature, executive, and judiciary, altering the very structure of the state. In his telling, it threatened to transform Bangladesh into a depoliticised entity vulnerable to external influence and internal fragmentation. Whether one shares this alarm or not, the concern highlights a broader dilemma: referendums can either invigorate constitutional life or destabilise it, depending on intent and safeguards.
Safeguards themselves were conspicuously absent, Rahman claims. He argues that the proposed process lacked credible mechanisms to protect civil society, opposition voices, and independent media during the campaign period. Without guarantees of procedural fairness, a referendum risks becoming a performative exercise rather than a deliberative one. The health of direct democracy depends not only on ballots but on the conditions under which those ballots are cast.
For now, the referendum appears politically shelved. The parliamentary mandate stands as the dominant source of authority. But the episode leaves behind an enduring question for Bangladesh: in a parliamentary republic forged through struggle, where does ultimate sovereignty reside, and how should it be exercised? The clash between mandate and referendum has underscored that democratic legitimacy is not only about counting votes. It is also about respecting the architecture that gives those votes constitutional meaning.
(Ashish Singh is a social and political scientist.)
