By Iryna Zhyrun
& Ashish Singh
A peace deal on the Russia-Ukraine conflict will be anything but easy. It will have to arrange a convoluted array of issues regarding European security architecture, territorial disputes, and post-conflict reconstruction of Ukraine. Even though these issues seem to be a question for the long haul, it is time to take a first step in establishing contact between the adversaries. The contact between Ukraine and Russia on a peace settlement has halted since Istanbul’s efforts in early 2022. Among multiple initiatives that arose in the last few years, it turned out to be problematic to find an appropriate mediator who could get the ball rolling. There are several reasons why India seems to meet the basic criteria of trust and possesses sufficient power leverage to provide a necessary platform for future negotiations.
First, both Ukraine and Russia perceive it as an independent and unbiased player. Earlier plans and mediators have been discharged for being either “pro-Russian” or “Western” (and therefore “pro-Ukrainian”). The perception of pro-Russian bias was the ground on which Ukraine discharged proposals put forward by Hungary, Kazakhstan, China and Brazil. Russia welcomed proposals coming from China, but did not take the ‘Summit on Peace in Ukraine’ in Switzerland seriously. Hungarian intent to establish contact between Russia and Ukraine in summer 2024 was appreciated, yet the reaction of Zelensky to Orban’s shuttle diplomacy is unknown. Contrariwise, Indian mediation is being received more warmly by both Russia and Ukraine due to its neutral position.
India has been prudent on making public statements on the peace plan. During a recent meeting between the National Security Advisor of India, Ajit Doval, and Russian President Putin, it was confirmed that negotiations between the parties were strictly confidential. Previously, India’s External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar underlined that solving the Ukrainian conflict was more important than participation in diplomatic processes for the sake of public influence. Both Russia and Ukraine seem to appreciate such a practical arrangement.
Since the start of hostilities in 2022, India took part in key meetings on the Ukrainian conflict resolution carefully balancing between the sides. It did not explicitly condemn Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, neither did it sign the Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework in Switzerland. The government of India took a more practical approach and supported Turkish endeavours to open up the Black Sea Grain Corridor and attended a number of Ukraine-related meetings in Copenhagen, Jeddah, Riyadh, Davos and Bürgenstock. In August 2024, the Indian Prime-Minister paid the first official visit to Ukraine after his visit to Russia. It seems that in the future India would be able to take essential steps in Russia-Ukraine conflict resolution due to its closeness to the conflicting sides and membership in strategic alliances. Being a BRICS member and a strategic partner of both Russia and the US could make India a key player in the negotiation process. Therefore, Indian position in the international power conjuncture combined with its neutrality and adherence to Non-Alignment values makes it a powerful mediator.
After the failure of the Istanbul peace initiative, Russia has been excluded from a dialogue on peace settlement in Ukraine. As such, it prioritised winning the battle on the ground, incorporated the new regions of Ukraine into the Russian Federation and secured a new context for the future peace negotiations. With a limited military force, Ukraine sought diplomatic but one-sided and limited (in Russia’s words “ephemeral”) efforts. In November 2022, Zelensky elaborated the “Ukraine’s Peace Formula Philosophy”, which consisted of 10 points. One of them was “Food security for Asian and African countries” which was supposed to win the hearts and minds of the Global South. Even though global food security remains one of the crucial aspects of the ongoing conflict, it failed to make India or other important Asian countries side with Ukraine.
What could be more productive is to include the United States in conflict resolution. The failure of the Minsk agreements signed in 2014-2015 could be attributed to the absence of the United States as one of the guarantors. Being a strategic partner of the US, India could try to bridge the gap between Russia and the US in that respect. The United States supplies ammunition and financial aid to Ukraine, making the Ukrainian government and army heavily dependent on American support. The US is not formally being a part of the problem, but mediation with the US could be a part of the solution. If Trump wins, his election may undermine the future aid to Ukraine which will finish in Ukrainian capitulation. That is why Zelensky insists on a summit in India before the decisive November elections in the US. So far, the official position of the US is that it remains “fully committed to Ukraine’s victory”.
After heavy military and civilian casualties, facing demographic catastrophe and infrastructure collapse, it is hard to say what Ukraine victory will look like. For Russia, being the most sanctioned country in the world, facing recent NATO enlargement and having difficulty dealing with trans-border incursions, the explanation of “victory” will also need some elaboration. Both countries need a careful mediator who could deal with their vulnerabilities with dignity.
For India, taking an active role is important to strengthen its position in the community of nation-states, as well as to find a balance between its own ambitions of getting close to Russia and US, both. India has been a traditional ally of Russia (previously the Soviet Union), and recently it has started to show its closeness with the Western block as well (given the fact that the rise of China has been seen as a threat by many nations, and India has already had several border clashes with China in the recent past). India also seeks to get a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, which Ukraine finds suitable now. Notable here is the fact that Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Russia (criticised by Zelensky and many commentators) was followed by his trip to Austria, and then he visited Ukraine. Modi did not forget to hug Zelensky multiple times, as his ‘open arms diplomacy’ with Russia was being targeted. All this may sound irrelevant to many, but from the cultural standpoint only close friends hug each other in the multilingual South Asian country.
Being the largest democracy and non-aligned country, India could serve as a good example for Ukraine in solving the issue of NATO membership. As NATO enlargement is one of the cornerstones to settle the conflict for Russia, changing Ukraine’s posture on the Alliance would set the ground for peace negotiation. However, Ukraine would need to transform its identity-based claims of NATO as a security community of democratic states, and Ukraine as an inherent part of it. India’s example may help Ukraine realise that it is possible to be non-aligned yet democratic. Another example can be set in the area of post-colonial relations. Ukraine has been arguing that the conflict with Russia is a part of its post-colonial legacy. Having said that, India could be an example of how constructive post-colonial relations could be established.
Resolution of Russia-Ukraine conflict could be possible when all parties are involved, even if establishing a common ground is arduous. India could step in as a powerful negotiator building these grounds on trust and common security interests.
(Iryna Zhyrun is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Bonn, Germany. Ashish Singh is a social and political scientist.)
