Home Editorials Tactical Change

Tactical Change

52
0
SHARE

The killing of two Special Police Officers (SPOs) in Kishtwar on 11 November, reflects a broader hybrid warfare strategy by Pakistan-backed groups to shift militancy south of the Pir Panjal range while exploiting local vulnerabilities. To counter this, India must combine hyper-local intelligence, strict movement protocols for small units, and clear deterrence under its post-Operation Sindoor security doctrine.

Security analysts and defence observers point to several calculated shifts in how cross-border networks operate in Jammu and Kashmir. Shifting South of Pir Panjal – with local militant recruitment in the Kashmir Valley dropping near zero and border fences heavily fortified, groups are pushing foreign fighters into forested, mountainous districts like Kishtwar, Doda, and Rajouri. They are targeting small teams of local SPOs and Village Defence Guards, thereby inflicting psychological damage, intimidating local informants, and looting service rifles and ammunition in remote terrain. Despite India’s May 2025 strikes under Operation Sindoor, Pakistani handlers have worked to reactivate border launch pads, install cross-border telecom towers, and build new Overground Worker (OGW) networks to guide small teams. The small-scale, deniable ambushes are designed to bleed Indian forces continuously without necessarily crossing the threshold of a major mass-casualty attack, while sowing distrust between local communities and security agencies.

Addressing this threat requires tactical adjustments on the ground alongside sustained strategic pressure. Strict movement protocols should be enforced. Security forces must stop small pairs of lightly armed SPOs from trekking through dense, high-risk forest corridors alone. Transit between Temporary Operating Bases (TOBs) and Army posts requires larger, well-equipped patrols with real-time radio tracking. Surveillance in forested terrain needs to be upgraded. The Army and J&K Police need to expand thermal imaging, drone surveillance, and ground sensors across the dense, hilly terrain of the Chenab Valley to neutralise the cover terrorists rely on.

As in the anti-Naxal strategy, OGW and sleeper networks should be dismantled. Investigations by the National Investigation Agency and local intelligence units must prioritise identifying and prosecuting local logistical supporters who provide shelter, food, and route intelligence to foreign militants. Local personnel form the backbone of human intelligence in remote villages. Authorities must ensure SPOs and VDGs receive modern weapons, reliable communications, dignified logistical treatment, and swift welfare support for their families.

At the same time, diplomatic and kinetic deterrence must be maintained. New Delhi must enforce its red line treating state-sponsored terror as an act of war, pairing diplomatic and economic pressure—such as the Indus Waters Treaty suspension—with targeted counter-infiltration operations.

Also, hard security works best when paired with responsive local governance and public accountability so that political controversies do not undermine counter-insurgency morale.