By Dr Kripa Nautiyal
As a captain of major Coast Guard ships in the late ‘90s and early 2000s, while carrying out maritime surveillance of areas along the notional Indo Pak International Maritime Boundary, I was able to witness closely the importance both India and Pakistan attach to the Sir Creek Area. The Sir Creek, a narrow 96-kilometre tidal estuary separating Gujarat’s Rann of Kutch from Pakistan’s Sindh province, has re-emerged as a flashpoint in the complex India-Pakistan relationship. Recent statements by India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, warning Pakistan about its military buildup at Sir Creek, signal a troubling escalation in a dispute that has remained unresolved since before Partition.
The roots of the Sir Creek dispute stretch back to 1908, when disagreements arose between the rulers of Kutch and Sindh over territorial division. A 1914 resolution by the Bombay Presidency attempted to settle the matter but created lasting ambiguity—one clause suggesting the boundary lies towards the outer edge of the creek, while another invoked international law with different implications. The issue resurfaced in the 1960s following the 1965 armed conflict, when Pakistan claimed half of the Rann of Kutch near the 24th parallel. An International Tribunal in 1968 upheld India’s claim to 90% of the Rann, but the Sir Creek boundary itself remained unresolved.
The core disagreement is deceptively simple yet carries enormous implications: India maintains the border runs through the middle of the creek, while Pakistan insists it lies on the creek’s eastern bank. This seemingly modest difference determines how the maritime boundary extends into the Arabian Sea, affecting access to potential hydrocarbon reserves, valuable fishing grounds, and billions of dollars’ worth undersea resources in both nations’ exclusive economic zones.
Since 1989, India and Pakistan have held six rounds of discussions without concrete progress. The talks, held alternately in Islamabad, Rawalpindi, and New Delhi between 1989 and 1998, have consistently foundered on fundamental disagreements. Pakistan insists the boundary in the creek must be demarcated first to establish a basis for the maritime boundary, linking land and sea border issues inextricably. India proposed a four-stage approach—allocation, delimitation, demarcation, and administration—but technical difficulties and political mistrust have prevented implementation.
This stands in stark contrast to India’s successful resolution of maritime boundaries with its other neighbours. With Sri Lanka, bilateral agreements were signed in 1974 and 1976, establishing a 288-kilometre maritime boundary spanning from the tripoint with the Maldives to the 200 nautical mile limit in the Palk Strait, Palk Bay, and Gulf of Mannar. With Bangladesh, despite decades of failed negotiations, the dispute was finally resolved through international arbitration under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In July 2014, the Permanent Court of Arbitration awarded Bangladesh 19,467 square kilometres of the disputed 25,602 square kilometres in the Bay of Bengal. Significantly, both India and Bangladesh accepted this binding ruling and used it as an opportunity to strengthen bilateral relations. These examples demonstrate that peaceful settlement of maritime disputes through negotiation or arbitration is possible when political will exists and Pakistan is sincerely ready to shed its links with terrorists.
For Pakistan, Sir Creek represents vital strategic depth for Karachi, its largest city and primary naval base, located merely 60 kilometres from the disputed boundary. Any Indian naval presence threatens Pakistan’s commercial lifeline and military infrastructure. For India, securing Sir Creek is essential to protecting Gujarat’s coastline, particularly the strategically vital Kandla port, and preventing the area from becoming an infiltration corridor.
The renewed focus on Sir Creek must be understood within the broader context of post-2019 military standoffs and Operation Sindoor. India’s naval modernisation—indigenous aircraft carriers, advanced submarines, and enhanced coastal surveillance—has fundamentally altered the maritime balance of power. Pakistan’s response has been to intensify its asymmetric naval strategy, leveraging Chinese military assistance to acquire advanced submarines and anti-ship missiles. The recent aggressive posturing appears calculated to test India’s resolve and signal that Pakistan will not accept any unilateral change to the status quo. Any misadventures by Pakistan in Sir Creek area may make them repent for generations to come.
Several trajectories emerge from the current situation. Renewed diplomatic engagement post understanding by Pakistan that it would stop all material and moral support to terrorists and show sincerity in its words and deeds could lead to creative solutions—the 1965 Rann of Kutch arbitration offers precedent for successful resolution. However, the more likely scenario is continued strategic competition managed through deterrence, with both sides maintaining forward presence while avoiding direct conflict.
Regular patrols along the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) off the Sir Creek area are conducted by the Indian Coast Guard and Pakistan Maritime Security Agency. These patrols serve a dual purpose: maintaining control over the disputed waters and preventing inadvertent crossing of the IMBL by fishing boats from both nations. Such operational arrangements, while not resolving the underlying territorial dispute, have proven essential in managing day-to-day tensions and avoiding incidents that could escalate into larger confrontations.
The stakes extend beyond a narrow creek in western India. How this dispute evolves will signal India’s ability to defend its maritime interests while managing relations with a terrorist infested nuclear-armed neighbour in an increasingly complex geopolitical environment.
(The author is a retired Additional Director General of the Indian Coast Guard and an alumnus of the United States Naval War College, Rhode Island, and has led number of multi-ministerial delegations to various countries for discussion on maritime issues.)
