By Dr Kripa Nautiyal
In a chilling development that exposes both Pakistan’s continued sponsorship of terrorism and the desperation following India’s Operation Sindoor, Jaish-e-Mohammed has announced the formation of its first-ever women’s brigade, “Jamaat-ul-Mominaat” (Community of Believing Women). This marks a seismic shift in South Asian terrorism, as JeM abandons its traditional stance against deploying women in combat operations, signalling an ominous escalation in Pakistan’s proxy war against India.
To understand this strategic pivot, one must first acknowledge what Operation Sindoor accomplished. India’s 7 May 2025 precision strikes destroyed the headquarters of JeM at Markaz Subhanallah in Bahawalpur, along with Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen infrastructure across Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. The operation, launched in retaliation for the Pahalgam attack that killed 26 tourists, dealt a crushing blow to Masood Azhar’s organisation—14 members of his family were killed, including his brother-in-law Yusuf Azhar, his elder sister Hawa Bibi, and several nephews including Jameel Ahmed, Hamza Jameel, and Huzaifa Azhar.
In a revealing video, JeM commander Ilyas Kashmiri confirmed these losses, stating the organisation “tukde tukde ho gaye” (torn to pieces). An emotional Masood Azhar was heard saying, “It would’ve been better if I had died too.” Yet rather than abandoning terrorism, Pakistan and JeM have doubled down with an even more sinister approach.
The formation of Jamaat-ul-Mominaat represents Pakistan’s calculated response to operational degradation. In a leaked 21-minute audio recording, Azhar announced plans to establish branches of the women’s wing in every district of Pakistan—a chilling demonstration of the scale and ambition behind this initiative. Recruitment began on 8 October 2025 at Markaz Usman-o-Ali in Bahawalpur, with the decision jointly approved by Masood Azhar and his brother Talha al-Saif.
The brigade’s leadership reveals the personal vendetta driving this initiative: Sadiya Azhar, Masood’s sister and widow of Yusuf Azhar killed in Operation Sindoor, heads the unit. She is assisted by another sister, Samaira Azhar (also known as Umme Masood), and Afeera Farooq, widow of Pulwama attacker Umar Farooq. Each district branch will be headed by a “District Muntazima” responsible for recruiting women and enforcing strict operational security protocols.
According to the audio recording, Azhar outlined a comprehensive blueprint for recruiting, training, and deploying women. Women recruits will undergo a 15-day training course called “Daura-e-Taskiya”, mirroring the male recruits’ “Daura-e-Tarbiat” programme, followed by specialised courses including “Daura-Ayat-ul-Nisah” and advanced training through “Tufat al-Muminat”. Most disturbingly, Azhar promises recruits that “any woman who joins JeM’s women brigade will go straight to paradise from her grave after death”—a transparent indication of intent to deploy female suicide bombers.
Operational security is paramount in Azhar’s blueprint. Strict rules prevent women in the brigade from speaking to unrelated men through phones or messaging apps, ensuring compartmentalisation and reducing infiltration risks. This level of operational sophistication indicates JeM’s serious commitment to making this brigade operational rather than merely symbolic.
JeM’s recruitment strategy exploits multiple vulnerabilities. The brigade specifically targets wives of JeM commanders, economically backward women studying at centres in Bahawalpur, Karachi, Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Haripur, and Mansehra and, crucially, 4-5 women whose male relatives were killed by Indian forces. These women are showcased under a campaign titled “Shoba-e-Dawat” to inspire new recruits through emotional manipulation.
The online radicalisation infrastructure is particularly concerning. Azhar’s sisters conduct daily 40-minute sessions via platforms like Zoom, targeting women across Jammu and Kashmir, Uttar Pradesh, and South India. Classes scheduled five days a week beginning 25 October combine religious indoctrination with jihadi ideology. On 19 October, a physical recruitment event called “Dukhtaran-e-Islam” (Daughters of Islam) was held in Rawalakot, PoK.
JeM collects 500 Pakistani rupees from each enrolee while requiring detailed personal information through online forms—simultaneously funding operations and building a database of radicalised women. Azhar’s recent address at Markaz Usman O Ali on 27 September included direct appeals for donations, revealing the organisation’s financial desperation post-Sindoor strikes.
The deployment of female terrorists is not unprecedented globally but represents a terrifying new chapter for South Asian terrorism. Organisations like ISIS, Boko Haram, Hamas, and LTTE have long utilised women as suicide attackers, exploiting societal assumptions that women pose less threat. However, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Hizbul Mujahideen had historically avoided this tactic—until now.
Intelligence assessments suggest JeM’s move signals clear intent to train and deploy female suicide bombers in future operations. Azhar’s promise of paradise to recruits after death confirms this grim trajectory. Women operatives present unique security challenges: they face less scrutiny at checkpoints, can access restricted areas more easily, and exploit gender-based security blind spots at soft targets including schools, hospitals, markets, and religious sites.
The formation of a women’s terror brigade while Pakistan claims to combat terrorism under FATF regulations exposes Islamabad’s blatant hypocrisy. Rather than dismantling terrorist infrastructure, JeM and other groups have strategically relocated bases to Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province near the Afghanistan border to escape future Indian strikes. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence continues providing sanctuary, resources, and operational support to these organisations.
This relocation creates additional vulnerabilities. KPK is Pakistan’s most restive region where the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan operates with relative impunity, having conducted over 600 attacks on Pakistani forces in 2025. The Afghan Taliban’s refusal to act against TTP has created a permanent sanctuary beyond Pakistan’s control, and the deteriorating Pakistan-Afghanistan relationship following Pakistani airstrikes on Kabul, Khost, Jalalabad, and Paktika reveals the instability of these regions.
India must urgently adapt its counterterrorism strategy to address this evolving threat. First, intelligence capabilities require immediate enhancement for monitoring online radicalisation platforms, infiltrating women-only terror networks, and developing gender-sensitive counterterrorism protocols. Security procedures at vulnerable locations must be revised to address threats from female operatives who evade traditional profiling.
Second, India should pursue aggressive international pressure for Pakistan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism. The evidence is incontrovertible: JeM openly recruiting women through online platforms while Pakistan claims FATF compliance demonstrates Islamabad’s duplicity. India must work with the United States, European Union, and other partners to ensure Pakistan faces severe economic and diplomatic consequences.
Third, military preparedness must be maintained for follow-up strikes. Operation Sindoor established critical precedents—assured retaliation, rejection of nuclear blackmail, and refusal to differentiate between terrorists and state sponsors. Future operations should target high-value terrorist leaders and infrastructure in KPK with even greater precision.
Fourth, India should leverage the Afghanistan opening. The Taliban’s recent visit to India and New Delhi’s decision to reopen its Kabul embassy signal strategic realignment. Cultivating this relationship through humanitarian assistance while ensuring Afghanistan doesn’t become a staging ground for Pakistan-sponsored terrorism will diplomatically isolate Islamabad.
Pakistan’s multi-front crisis creates unprecedented opportunities for India. Beyond battling TTP in the northwest, Pakistan faces separatist movements in Balochistan, economic meltdown, and growing international isolation. China’s support remains strong, but Beijing grows increasingly concerned about regional instability.
The formation of Jamaat-ul-Mominaat represents not strength but desperation—a cornered Pakistan attempting to regenerate its terrorist capabilities through a morally bankrupt strategy of weaponising women. India’s response must be comprehensive, sustained, and unrelenting. The objective is clear: fundamentally alter Pakistan’s cost-benefit calculus by making the price of supporting terrorism unbearable for its military establishment. Only then will South Asia find genuine peace.
(The Author is a retired Additional Director General of the Indian Coast Guard and has a master’s degree in Defence and Strategic Studies. He is also and is an alumnus of the United States Naval War College, Rhode Island.)
