By Brig Sarvesh Dutt (Pahadi) Dangwal (Retd)
On 22 April 2025, the killing of 26 innocent Indian civilians in a brutal terrorist attack in Pahalgam shook the conscience of the nation. The attack, orchestrated by Pakistan-based terror groups with the overt support of the Pakistan Army and its intelligence apparatus, was yet another stark reminder of the enduring threat that state-sponsored terrorism poses to India’s sovereignty, security, and civilian life. In the wake of this aggression, the Indian Armed Forces responded decisively through a well-coordinated kinetic campaign—Operation Sindoor 1.0 and 2.0—bringing the Pakistan military establishment to the brink of collapse. Yet, in a puzzling and strategically questionable move, India agreed to a ceasefire shortly thereafter.
This essay contends that the ceasefire was a premature and grave strategic misstep that forfeited a rare opportunity to impose decisive and lasting costs on the Pakistan Army’s doctrine of asymmetric warfare. It was a chance to permanently dismantle the infrastructure and ideological base of terrorism that has defined Pakistan’s military policy since the late 20th century. By bowing to international pressure, particularly from the United States, India may have secured a temporary calm but has sacrificed a long-term strategic gain. In doing so, it has inadvertently breathed new life into an adversary that thrives on duplicity, denial, and jihadist ideology.
Pakistan’s Military Doctrine: Terror as an Instrument of State Policy
The roots of Pakistan’s use of terrorism as a proxy against India can be traced back to the military doctrine established under General Zia-ul-Haq during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Confronted with the overwhelming conventional superiority of the Indian military, Pakistan opted for an asymmetric strategy—one that weaponised religious extremism and nurtured terror groups under the garb of “freedom fighters” in Kashmir. This strategy, euphemistically referred to as “bleeding India by a thousand cuts,” offered Pakistan plausible deniability while inflicting constant attritional damage on India’s civil and military establishments.
The strategic brilliance of this doctrine, from Pakistan’s perspective, lay in its cost-effectiveness and the global community’s unwillingness to call out its duplicity. The so-called non-state actors were armed, trained, and funded by state institutions such as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), which became the pivot around which Pakistan’s security and foreign policy revolved. The ideological underpinnings of this policy, deeply rooted in Islamic radicalism and theological promises of martyrdom, gave it a depth and longevity that conventional military doctrines lack.
For India, this has meant living under a constant threat—be it the Kargil intrusion in 1999, the Parliament attack in 2001, the Mumbai attacks of 2008, or the more recent Pulwama and Pahalgam incidents. Despite repeated attempts at dialogue, bilateral agreements (notably the Simla Agreement of 1972), and Confidence Building Measures (CBMs), Pakistan has consistently reneged on its commitments, choosing instead to exploit peace overtures as strategic pauses to regroup and rearm.
The Strategic Blunder of the Ceasefire
Given this historical backdrop, the Indian government’s decision to agree to a ceasefire post-Operation Sindoor is deeply problematic. The twin operations had reportedly crippled key military installations, decimated terror camps across the Line of Control, and significantly eroded Pakistan’s conventional capabilities. Morale within the Pakistan Army was at its nadir, public discontent was spilling onto the streets, and the internal fault lines of Pakistan—particularly in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa—were beginning to widen under the strain.
It was in this moment of strategic ascendancy that India inexplicably accepted a ceasefire proposal, reportedly nudged by American diplomatic intervention. This move, far from being a gesture of magnanimity or restraint, has undermined years of counterterrorism effort and emboldened a duplicitous adversary. History is replete with examples where nations, having gained an upper hand, have pressed home the advantage to secure long-term peace through strength. India, in this case, chose to do otherwise.
The Ideological Intransigence of the Pakistan Army
It is critical to understand that, for the Pakistan Army, hostility towards India is not merely a strategic compulsion but a core ideological tenet. From its very inception on 14 August 1947, Pakistan’s identity has been defined in contradistinction to India. Over the decades, the military establishment has positioned itself as the guardian of this identity, ensuring its dominance in the country’s political, economic, and religious life. Any
rapprochement with India threatens this hegemony, which explains the army’s enduring commitment to sustaining conflict.
This commitment is further buttressed by a radical Islamic theology that sanctifies jihad as a divine duty and martyrdom as a guaranteed path to paradise. The promise of celestial rewards—including the oft-invoked imagery of virgins in heaven—is cynically used to recruit, indoctrinate, and motivate young men to carry out acts of terror. This toxic mix of religious fervour and military patronage forms the bedrock of Pakistan’s asymmetric warfare strategy—a reality that no ceasefire can wish away.
Therefore, expecting Pakistan to abandon this doctrine simply because of a ceasefire is not only naïve but dangerous. Unless the cost of such strategies becomes existentially prohibitive, the Pakistan Army will continue to rely on terror as an instrument of state policy.
Missed Opportunities: Exploiting Internal Fault Lines
By halting military operations prematurely, India has also missed a golden opportunity to exploit Pakistan’s internal vulnerabilities. The restive province of Balochistan has been simmering with separatist sentiment, fuelled by years of economic neglect, military repression, and ethnic discrimination. Similarly, the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has wreaked havoc in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region, drawing ideological and logistical support from across the Afghan border.
A prolonged military campaign by India—carefully calibrated to avoid escalation into full-scale war—could have exacerbated these internal crises. It would have stretched Pakistan’s already depleted resources, weakened its internal cohesion, and perhaps compelled a re-evaluation of its militaristic approach towards India. Unfortunately, by agreeing to a ceasefire at the behest of external powers, India has foreclosed these strategic options.
The Role of the United States: Friend or Interloper?
While the United States has often positioned itself as a friend of India, its actions in this instance suggest otherwise. American interest in South Asia has historically been transactional, guided more by short-term geopolitical compulsions than principled commitment to democracy or peace. In pressing India to de-escalate, the United States may have been acting to reserve stability in Afghanistan, protect its logistical interests in Central Asia, or curry favour with Islamabad for other strategic imperatives.
India must recognise that great powers pursue their interests, not friendships. Any foreign policy that subordinates national interest to external persuasion—howsoever well-intentioned—is bound to falter. New Delhi must learn to assert its strategic autonomy, especially when dealing with matters that impinge on national security.
Way Forward: Recalibrating the Ceasefire
Given the realities on the ground, it is imperative that the Government of India redefines the contours of the ceasefire agreement. It must not be an unconditional truce, but a tactical pause predicated on demonstrable and verifiable commitments by Pakistan to dismantle terror infrastructure, prosecute perpetrators, and
renounce the use of non-state actors.
Furthermore, India must reserve the right to respond militarily to any future terror incident, irrespective of its magnitude or location. The Indus Waters Treaty, a long-standing arrangement that disproportionately benefits Pakistan, must be revisited and reinterpreted as a strategic lever. Any terror misadventure must be deemed an act of war, inviting retaliatory action not only on the battlefield but through diplomatic, economic, and water-sharing channels.
Conclusion
The 2025 ceasefire, in the aftermath of the Pahalgam terror attack, will be remembered as a lost strategic opportunity. It reflects a pattern wherein India has repeatedly stopped short of decisive action, allowing a wounded adversary to recover and regroup. In the theatre of geopolitics, such lapses carry grave consequences.
For peace to prevail, it must be built on the ruins of terror—not on fragile agreements or externally brokered ceasefires. The Pakistan Army, driven by ideological zeal and strategic insecurity, will not abandon its jihadist doctrine unless compelled to do so by force and sustained pressure. India must therefore rethink its approach—eschewing half-measures in favor of a bold, unwavering strategy that prioritizes national security above all else.
Only then can we truly honour the lives lost at Pahalgam and ensure that such tragedies do not recur.
